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Abstract
We examine the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the European debt
crisis of 2011 on the relationship between capital structure, investments, and per-
formance for Eastern European companies. While the existing literature documents
how firms’ investments are sensitive to the availability of internal funds and to debt
holdings, we further investigate whether this investment sensitivity also translates
in different levels of performance, and document that capital structure indeed has
both a direct and an indirect effect, mediated by the capital expenditure channel. We
show that firms with higher financial flexibility experience higher investments and
returns on capital. Over-levered firms instead suffer from a debt overhang condition,
forcing them to curb investments, and consequently experiencing lower performance.
Overall, we provide evidence on the importance of capital structure and financial
flexibility on investments and performance, showing the real consequences of the
debt overhang condition on firm value creation. Firms should therefore aim at main-
taining adequate financial flexibility in order to be able to pursue future profitable
investment opportunities, and avoid the under-investment problem arising from a
debt overhang situation.
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1. Introduction
We study the potential effects of financing decisions on the performance of firms based
in the transition economies of Eastern Europe, focusing in particular on the effects of
excess leverage in times of global financial turbulence. Modigliani and Miller (1958)
show that, under perfect capital markets, capital structure is irrelevant, and companies
can undertake all value-generating investments regardless of how they decide to raise
the required capital. As a consequence, the value of a firm does not depend on how
it chooses to fund its operations. When imperfections are introduced in the model,
though, capital structure may affect the investment decisions and the value of firms.
As a result, firms may have an optimal level of leverage that maximizes their value by
balancing costs and benefits of alternative financing decisions, like the tax-deductibility
of interest payments (Modigliani and Miller (1963)), bankruptcy costs (Stiglitz (1969)),
and agency costs (see, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), and
Jensen (1986)).
A smaller stream of literature has investigated what are the ‘real’ consequences
of capital structure decisions, studying whether they produce effects on operating,
rather than purely financial, outcomes. This line of research shows how, for example,
financially flexible firms – defined as those with a debt ratio below its optimal level –
may have a greater ability to undertake investment opportunities (see, among others,
Denis and Sibilkov (2010) and Duchin et al. (2010)), so that, under certain conditions,
maintaining excess debt capacity may result in a value-enhancing strategy for a firm,
despite the costs associated with lower-than-optimal leverage. Indeed, Graham and
Harvey (2001) report that 59% of the CFOs they survey indicate financial flexibility
as an important determinant of leverage levels, resulting in the single most commonly
cited factor. Campello et al. (2010) survey 1,050 chief financial officers in various
countries in December 2008 to gather direct information about the impact of financial
constraints caused by the financial crisis (and the associated recession) of that year
on corporate policies. They report that financially constrained firms planned to cut
investments more, compared to financially unconstrained firms, and were forced to
consume a relevant portion of their cash savings to support their activity. Moreover,
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nearly 90% of constrained companies said that financial constraints restricted their
pursuit of attractive projects, and more than half of them were forced to cancel valuable
investments. All these findings suggest that firms that were over-levered before the
beginning of the financial crisis are likely to have suffered from lower investments in
the subsequent years. However, it doesn’t provide evidence on the overall effects on
the subsequent performance of companies.
Building on the existing evidence on the importance of financial flexibility, Almeida
et al. (2011) develop an inter-temporal model of leverage decisions to account for the
effects of current decisions on future costs of raising capital. Their model shows how
current high leverage may have a significant impact on future financing costs, and,
through this, distort real investments away from their optimal levels. The expected
reduction in value due to distorted investments might explain why firms set their
debt ratio lower than the supposedly optimal target derived from traditional trade-
off models. Future financial flexibility is therefore a key variable to account for when
setting a firm’s leverage ratio. On the contrary, having too much debt would put firms
in a ‘debt overhang’ condition, so that they give up otherwise profitable investment
opportunities because their capital structure doesn’t allow them to raise the required
capital, or would allow them to do so only at significant costs.
We focus on this potential source of frictions, and empirically investigate the effects
of capital structure decisions of listed firms located in the transition economies of East-
ern Europe on their ability to pursue investment opportunities and create value during
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the European Debt Crisis (EDC). Indeed, both
the GFC and the EDC caused a negative shock to capital supply, hence providing an
interesting environment for testing the effect of alternative financing strategies on
the value creation of firms. We contribute to the existing literature by focusing on
the effects in times of financial crises of excessive debt on corporate investments and
on firms’ performance, both directly and indirectly through the capital expenditure
channel. In addition, by focusing on firms that are not incorporated in one of the
economies where the GFC and the EDC originated, we provide firm-level evidence on
the effects that these two events have produced also on firms based in other countries,
contributing to the literature on economic and financial integration.
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More specifically, the aim of this work is to understand whether maintaining fi-
nancial flexibility is a value enhancing strategy, and what are its effects on firms’
investment decisions. To this end, we first identify financially flexible firms by esti-
mating a leverage equation from which we can determine a firm-specific optimal level
of debt. We then define financial flexibility, an unobservable characteristic, as the de-
viation of observed leverage from the estimated optimal value. Finally, we estimate
whether this wedge between actual and optimal leverage produces any effect on the
level of investments and on performance. If firms are able to properly identify future
growth opportunities, they may decide to maintain spare debt capacity to be able to
quickly raise new external capital when they need to undertake new investments. If
this hypothesis hold, then we should observe a positive impact of financial flexibility
on investments and, through this channel, on future performance. However, too little
leverage may also damage a firm’s performance, as shown by Jensen (1986), because
managers use available funds to pursue private perks, rather than efficient investment
policies. If this is true, we would then obtain that financially flexible firms invest
more, but these higher investments translate into a decrease in performance, because
of inefficient investment decisions.
Through this analysis, we find that companies in the transition economies of Eastern
Europe were deeply affected by the financial turmoil that originated in 2008 in the US
and, later in 2011, in Western Europe. We provide evidence on the validity of the debt
overhang hypothesis: over-levered firms experience a negative effect on their ability
to pursue optimal levels of investment and, ultimately, to produce higher returns to
investors. Firms that entered the global financial crisis of 2008 with lower-than-optimal
leverage experienced higher cumulative profits in the following decade. We also report
a strong and significant debt sensitivity of investments, producing an indirect and
significant effect on performance. Our findings therefore show how companies that are
able to maintain financial flexibility in the form of spare debt capacity are not only
able to invest more, but also seem to take more profitable investment decisions. The
fact that firms accumulate financial resources in the form of spare debt capacity does
not therefore translate in an inefficient use of capital. This indicates that the potential
agency issues connected with lower-than-optimal leverage are more than compensated
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by the increased ability to pursue profitable growth opportunities, limiting the debt
overhang issue. Firms may therefore rationally decide to maintain sub-optimal levels
of leverage in order to avoid incurring in financial constraints that would force them
to pass up profitable investment opportunities.
While there is ample work on the determinants of capital structure, on the analysis
of investment decisions, and on the debt or cash holdings sensitivity of investments,
there is little work on the complex link between financial decisions, investments, and
the operating performance of firms. Through our analysis, we contribute to expanding
our understanding on the link between financial and investment decisions, and their
effects on the operating performance of firms. Overall, our findings provide evidence
against the irrelevance of capital structure, on the value of financial flexibility, and on
the consequences of the debt overhang condition on firm value creation.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the pertinent literature and
presents the research hypotheses that we intend to investigate. Section 3 illustrates
the methodology adopted for our investigation, while Section 4 describes the dataset
used. Section 5 discusses our findings, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review and research hypotheses
In a friction-less world, Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that firms’ financial struc-
ture is irrelevant for their investment decisions because external funds can always be
raised at no cost when internal funds are not sufficient. However, imperfections in the
real world do not allow firms to obtain new capital without incurring in additional
costs, and, as a consequence, internal and external funds are not perfect substitutes
(Fazzari et al. (1988)).
A significant stream of literature has therefore investigated the effects of financial
constraints and changes in capital supply on the ability of firms to pursue new in-
vestment opportunities (Hoshi et al. (1991); Kaplan and Zingales (1997); Arslan et al.
(2006); Aggarwal and Zong (2006); Lemmon and Roberts (2010); Ahiadorme et al.
(2018)). All these works highlight how firms are forced to curb investments when in-
ternal funds are not sufficient and they are facing constraints on their ability to raise
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new capital, either because of external shocks to capital supply or because of firm-level
conditions that dissuade investors from providing the requested funds. As a result, fi-
nancially constrained firms may under-perform their peers due to a systematic lower
level of investment caused by their inability to raise the required capital. Indeed, Botta
(2019a) shows how, in a sample of small and medium-sized firms operating in the ho-
tel industry, failing to adopt an optimal capital structure produces a lower financial
performance.
More recently, some authors have begun to investigate the real effects of the GFC
on the corporate sector looking at the impact on firms’ investments, as the GFC
itself provides for an extraordinary negative shock in capital supply that may have
significantly affected corporate behaviors. In particular, Duchin et al. (2010) show
how corporate investments declined significantly for US firms at the outburst of the
global financial crisis, with a stronger reduction for firms with low cash reserves or
high short-term debt, a result consistent with the hypothesis that shocks to capital
supply may affect investment decisions. Their findings suggest that firms face a relevant
motive for accumulating precautionary savings, or maintaining excess debt capacity,
in order to support their investment strategies even under negative market conditions,
an effect that is often neglected in the literature, both theoretical and empirical.
Similarly, Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014) analyze the effect of the Asian 1997–1998
crisis and the 2007-2009 credit crisis on the investments of East Asian firms. They
report that firms with higher financial flexibility before the Asian crisis experienced
a greater ability to take investment opportunities, and had to rely much less on the
availability of internal funds to invest. They also report that similar effects can be
observed following the GFC, but in a much weaker form, suggesting that local crises
may have a larger impact than international ones, at least in emerging economies.
They also find that the value of financial flexibility is country-specific, because of dif-
ferences either in national institutions or in financial conditions (like currency regimes,
exchange rate risk, monetary policy). Francis et al. (2013) report similar findings on
the interconnection between firms’ financial constraints and national institutions in a
sample of companies from fourteen different emerging market countries. They report
that better corporate governance lowers the dependence of emerging market firms on
6
internally generated funds, and reduces financing constraints that would otherwise dis-
tort investment decisions. They also find that firm-level corporate governance matters
more significantly in countries with weaker country-level governance, suggesting some
form of substitution effect between firm-specific and country-level governance.
Balfoussia and Gibson (2019) investigate whether the sensitivity of firm-level in-
vestment to cash flow for companies within the Euro Area is time-varying, focusing in
particular on changes in market-wide financial conditions. Looking at the effect of the
GFC on corporate behavior, they report that financial conditions have indeed played a
significant role in corporate investment decisions, especially for financially constrained
firms.
Finally, Casey and O’Toole (2014) focus instead on the behavior of European
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) during the GFC. They report how credit-
rationed firms were more likely to rely on trade credit, and also more likely to use
informal lending or loans from other companies. They also find no evidence that bank-
constrained SMEs resorted to market finance to raise new capital. In particular, they
find that firms denied credit for working capital turned to trade credit, while informal
and inter-company lending acted as a substitute for bank loans aimed at funding new
investments.
These findings are consistent with results concerning the role of macroeconomic
conditions and national institutions on cash holdings management (Demir and Er-
san (2017); Orlova and Sun (2018)), capital structure decisions (Korajczyk and Levy
(2003); Cook and Tang (2010); Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011); Öztekin and
Flannery (2012); Belkhir et al. (2016); Alcock and Steiner (2017); Botta and Colombo
(2017); Çolak et al. (2018)), the cost of issuing equity (Guyot et al. (2014); Botta
(2019b)), and the cost of borrowing new funds (Krivogorsky et al. (2018)).
All these factors may indeed contribute to explain why financially constrained firms
may suffer an under-investment problem, and particularly so during a financial crisis.
If raising new capital is costly, and more so during a financial crisis, then firms with
insufficient internal funds may give up profitable investment opportunities because the
costs they would incur in raising the required capital, and especially additional equity,
are greater then the net present value of the potential new investment. As a result,
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past financing decisions, by affecting the availability of internal funds and spare debt
capacity, may affect future investment decisions and a firm’s ability to support growth
and returns to investors.
We build on this literature and analyze whether, during both the GFC and the
EDC, past financing decisions affected firms’ ability to generate new value for their
investors. This may be a consequence of under-investments by capital-constrained firms
(Myers (1977)) that obstacles the pursuit of an efficient investment plan and ends up
reducing the operating performance. In addition, firms may suffer from a decline in
sales or an increase in costs because of the indirect costs of financial distress (Opler and
Titman (1994)), hence suffering again a lower performance because of their excessive
debt. However, firms may also benefit from moderate amounts of debt, because it
reduces the amount of cash flow under the control of managers, who may otherwise
destroy value by investing internal funds to pursue private perks rather than value-
increasing projects (Jensen (1986)). While the literature, as described above, has often
investigated whether financial conditions affect the level of investments, there is little
evidence concerning the implications on the overall performance of firms.
We hypothesize that, in line with the literature, over-indebted firms suffer from a
severe debt overhang condition during a financial crisis, and are forced to reduce their
investments due to the difficulties and the costs of raising additional capital. In turn,
this reduction in investments affects their operating performance in the subsequent
periods, so that excessive leverage produces an indirect effect on future performance,
through the capital expenditure channel.
Focusing on Eastern European countries allows us to evaluate the effects of the GFC
and the EDC in transition economies that are becoming more and more integrated
with the advanced western economies. In fact, on the one hand, Nivorozhkin (2005)
shows that firms in the transition economies of Eastern Europe have similar debt ratios
to their competitors in Western European countries. They also display a similar speed
of adjustment of their capital structure, and the factors that affect the target debt
ratios of firms in Western Europe are also valid determinants for their counterparts
in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Muradoǧlu et al. (2014) shows the importance
of capital supply factors on firms’ financing choices, by showing that firms increase
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equity financing when their country of residence joins the EU (thus allowing for an
higher integration of the local equity market1), while they increase debt financing (as
well as both short and long-term borrowing) when their country adopts the Euro, an
event likely to improve the credit channel. By analyzing firms incorporated in Eastern
Europe, we are able to investigate if and how the financial turbulence generated in
the US, during the global financial crisis, and in western Europe, during the European
debt crisis, has propagated to the companies of countries that had only recently joined
the European Union and, in some cases, the Euro, thus contributing to the firm-level
literature on economic and financial integration.
3. Methodology
3.1. Analysis of corporate investments
We investigate the determinants of firms’ investments (capital expenditure, or CE ) as
a function of the difference between the effective debt ratio of the company and its
estimated optimal level, that we define excess debt2. We also include a set of firm
characteristics as control variables, in an augmented version of a classic investment
model (see, among others, Fazzari et al. (1988), or Arslan et al. (2006)).
In order to control for potential endogeneity in the investment equation, and to
account for persistence in the level of investments, we use the dynamic panel system-
GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). This method allows us to
accurately account for persistence and endogeneity, and to properly treat the relatively
small sample size with respect to the time dimension. To this ends, the dynamic
1Bekaert et al. (2013) show that equity market integration in Europe was achieved mainly during the accession
phase to the EU, while the launch of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the adoption of the Euro had a
non-significant impact. In order to join the EU, Eastern European countries had to sign the Maastricht Treaty,
which prescribes the free movement of goods, capital, people and services between EU members. Moreover,
they had to implement in their national laws the prescriptions of the EU directives, including those aimed at
harmonizing the regulation of capital markets and financial services. As a consequence, joining the EU implied
that foreign investors had free access to equity markets, and that regulation was in the same line as that of
advanced European economies, resulting in effective protection of transparency and property rights. In the end,
this allowed for an increase in the supply of equity capital for domestic firms.
2See Appendix A for a thorough description of how we estimate a firm-specific measure of excess debt.
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panel system-GMM method jointly estimates a regression of the relevant equation
in differences together with the regression in levels (hence why it is called a system-
GMM estimator), using lagged levels as instruments for the regression in differences
and lagged differences as instruments for the regression in levels.
In order to provide valid results, the system-GMM estimator requires that differ-
ences of the right-hand side variables must not be correlated with the firm-specific
effect. To assess the validity of our instruments we perform an m2 test for second-
order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, as well as the Hansen J-test of
over-identifying restrictions. Both tests indicate that the model chosen and the set of
instruments used are appropriate.
Equation (1) defines our regression model:
CEi,t =α+ ρ ∗ CEi,t−1 + β1 ∗ excess debti,t−1 ∗NEDi,t−1+
+ β2 ∗ excess debti,t−1 ∗ EDi,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + ui + εi,t
(1)
where i indicates firm, and t indicates time, ED is a dummy equal to one if the firm
is above target leverage in the corresponding year, NED is a dummy equal to one if
the firm is instead below target leverage in the corresponding year, excess debt is the
difference between observed leverage and the estimated target leverage, ui indicates
firm fixed effects, α, β, and ρ are parameters, and ε is the error term.
The set of control variables includes firm characteristics that are likely to affect
firms’ investment decisions, in line with the previous literature3. First, we control for
investment opportunities by means of two classic determinants of capital expenditure:
the variable growth, as a proxy for Tobin’s Q and measured as the ratio between the
total market capitalization and the book value of equity, and profit, defined as the
ratio between operating cash flow and total assets, and measuring the ability of a firm
to generate new funds from its operating activity. Then, we include size, measured as
the natural logarithm of firm sales, corrected for inflation4, as a proxy for the maturity
of a firm, and tangible, defined as the ratio of fixed tangible assets to total assets, and
3See, among others, Hubbard (1998); Malmendier and Tate (2005); McNichols and Stubben (2008); Garćıa-
Sánchez and Garćıa-Meca (2018).
4We deflate nominal values using 2010 as the base year.
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intangible, defined as the ratio of fixed intangible assets to total assets to account for
the investments required for maintaining the efficiency of fixed assets already in place.
Finally, we include a set of variables to account for additional financial factors, like the
availability of internal funds (cash), defined as the sum of cash and equivalents divided
by total assets, the net working capital ratio (WC ) to correct for the risk connected
with operating payables and receivables, and the Ohlson’s O-score (Ohlson) to consider
the overall risk of default given the financial and operating assets and liabilities of the
firm5.
It is worth noting that the analysis may suffer from a very specific endogeneity issue
for which we need to control appropriately. Firms may have low growth opportunities,
and therefore decide to increase their leverage ratio to control agency problems, and,
simultaneously, because of the low growth opportunities, invest less. This may produce
a negative relationship between leverage and investment that is not an indication of
higher debt hampering the ability to invest, but rather that firms with lower growth
opportunities invest less and at the same time use high levels of debt to control man-
agerial efficiency. In order to control for this potential reverse causality, we include
an estimate of growth opportunities both in the target leverage equation and in the
investment equation. This way, our results explicitly incorporate the effects of growth
opportunities on the decisions concerning both the optimal level of debt and the opti-
mal level of investments. Therefore, our findings are net of the effect that might be due
to this reverse causality of growth opportunities on investments and debt decisions.
3.2. Analysis of value creation
In a second step, we then investigate firms’ ability to produce value for investors by
means of the Return on Assets (ROA)6. We define ROA as earnings before interest and
taxes (EBIT ) divided by total assets. The advantage of this metric is that it is easily
understood, it can be calculated from available data, and it can be decomposed in
different components to highlight how different aspects of managing a company affect
the overall ability in creating new value. Moreover, its value is independent on capi-
5For a thorough description of how the index is calculated, see Ohlson (1980).
6See, among others, Ramezani et al. (2002) for a discussion on how to measure firm value creation.
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tal structure, hence making its value directly comparable among firms with different
leverage policies7. We concentrate our attention in particular on two components of
ROA. First, we analyze the return on sales (ROS ), obtained as the ratio between EBIT
and net sales, that measures the operating efficiency of a firm by indicating the mar-
gin produced for each unit of sales. Then, we analyze the asset turnover (Turnover),
obtained as the ratio between net sales and total assets, that indicates the ability of
a firm in deploying its assets to generate revenues. In other words, it summarizes the
amount of revenues that a firm is able to generate per unit of assets in place, and it
measures the effectiveness of a firm in the use of its assets.
Given our focus on the role of financing decisions on firms’ performance, we an-
alyze ROA (and its two components) by including excess debt as a direct potential
determinant. More specifically, as for the analysis of capital expenditure, we include
the variable excess debt interacted with both the dummy ED and the dummy NED in
order to allow for different effects of increases in leverage between under-levered and
over-levered firms. We then explore the potential indirect effect of capital structure on
future returns, through its effect on firms’ investments (the ‘capital expenditure chan-
nel’). To this end, we include the variable capex, in order to both test whether higher
investments are associated with higher performance and, depending on the results of
the analysis of the debt-capital expenditure relation, also to assess the potential ex-
istence of an indirect effect of capital structure. Further regressors (already described
in the previous section) are then added to the analysis as additional controls, in order
to better isolate and identify the effect of capital structure on performance. As before,
we rely on the dynamic panel system-GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond
(1998) in order to account for both potential endogeneity and serial correlation in the
dependent variables ROA, ROS, and Turnover. Again, following our estimation we
perform all the tests that are necessary to ensure that the model is properly specified
and that we use a valid set of instruments in order to obtain robust results.
7On the contrary, the most common alternative metric, the return on equity (or ROE), depends crucially
on financing decisions, since it measures the returns produced for shareholders only. Therefore, two companies
with the same operating performance but a different capital structure would produce different values of ROE.
In our analysis, we want to test whether leverage policies affect operating performance, and therefore we need
a performance metric that, in its calculation, is independent of capital structure.
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4. Dataset
Our dataset includes yearly observations for firms listed in any of the following East-
ern European countries that are currently members of the European Union: Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slo-
vakia, and Slovenia. Data are collected for the period that goes from 2004 until 2017.
Selecting countries that belong to the European Union ensures that the companies in
the sample operate in a regulatory framework that is homogeneous, due to the harmo-
nization process required for accessing the European Union itself. Finally, we require
firms to have at least three consecutive years of data in order to be included in our
sample. The resulting sample comprises a total of 18.536 firm-year observations. We
retrieve all accounting data from Worldscope, while market and macroeconomic data
are from Datastream.
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of firms in the sample across time and countries.
[Table 1 about here.]
In line with the capital structure literature, the sample does not include financial and
utility companies, because their financing decisions are severely affected by industry-
specific regulations, which would make them hardly comparable with companies in
other sectors. Firms are sorted within industries based on the four-digit code assigned
by Worldscope.
5. Results
5.1. Capital structure and investments
The capital structure literature hints at the possibility that over-indebted firms with
low internal funds may have experienced a decrease in investments during both the
GFC and the EDC, because their debt capacity was exhausted and they were reluc-
tant at issuing new equity, consistently with the results in Kahle and Stulz (2013),
either because it would have been too costly or because investors were not willing to
take up new equity issues in a period of high uncertainty and increased risk aversion
(Dissanaike et al. (2014)).
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We therefore begin our empirical analysis by investigating the relationship between
firm investments and their capital structure. We focus, in particular, on the effect
on capital expenditure of the deviation of the observed leverage from the estimated
optimal level, as described in Section 3, to examine whether excessive leverage produces
any effect on the level of investments. Table 2 reports the results.
[Table 2 about here.]
When looking at the entire sample period, we find a negative effect of excess debt
on capital expenditure. When a firm increases leverage above its optimal level, capital
expenditure decreases, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coeffi-
cient for excess debt*ED. There is instead no effect if leverage increases but remains
below its optimal level, as indicated by the coefficient for excess debt*NED, showing
the existence of a kink in the debt-capital expenditure relation.8. The coefficient for
the lagged dependent variable is significant and ranging between 19% and 26%, a sign
that the persistence of firm investments over time is relatively moderate.
These findings are confirmed when looking at the two sub-periods (the GFC and
the EDC, respectively). It is interesting to note how this effect has become stronger
during the EDC, suggesting that the debt overhang issue has become more binding
during that period. We obtain similar results when focusing on the Ohlson’s O-score
(Ohlson): firms with higher financial risk (i.e. a higher value of the score) invest less,
another sign of the existence of financial constraints.
We also find that the cash ratio (cash) has a positive effect on capital expenditure,
and this effect is stronger during the GFC than in the EDC or the entire sample. The
sensitivity of corporate investments to excessive debt usage is therefore significant, and
becomes stronger during periods of financial turbulence, providing evidence in favour
of the debt overhang hypothesis.
Our findings also suggest that firms incorporated in countries belonging to the Euro
area did not display a higher or lower level of investments than those in other countries.
8Note that NED is a dummy variable equal to one if excess debt is negative. Recall also that excess debt is
negative when a firm’s leverage is below the target, so that in this case an increase in excess debt indicates
that a firm is moving closer to the target. As a consequence, a positive coefficient, if statistically significant,
would imply a positive effect of leverage increases.
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Indeed, while the coefficient for Euro is statistically significant in the full sample and in
the EDC sub-sample, its magnitude indicates that the economic impact was negligible.
5.2. Capital structure, investments and profits
In this second step, we investigate whether the effect of capital structure on investments
translates into a lower ability of firms to create value for their investors. Table 3
summarizes our findings.
[Table 3 about here.]
The first thing to notice is that the degree of persistence for ROA and ROS is
relatively low. Except for the GFC period, it is instead quite strong for the asset
turnover ratio.
Then, starting with the analysis of overall performance (measured by ROA) over
the full sample period, we find a negative effect of excessive debt. Moreover, we find
a positive effect of capex, indicating that firms that invest more experience higher
returns on their assets. Given the negative effect of excess debt on investments reported
before, this also implies a negative indirect effect of debt on profits: due to the debt
overhang issue, over-levered firms invest less. These lower investments, in turn, produce
a negative effect on firm performance. This is highlighted also by the analysis of asset
turnover : by investing less, firms experience a reduced ability to deploy their assets to
generate revenues, possibly because their assets in place become obsolete. We also find
a negative effect of excess debt on the asset turnover, while we do not detect any effect
of leverage on operating efficiency, neither direct nor indirect: ROS is not significantly
affected by leverage, nor by capital expenditure. Next, we repeat the analysis for the
GFC sub-period. Here, we also find a direct effect of excessive leverage on performance
and on asset turnover, as well as an indirect effect through the capital expenditure
channel. In fact, the overall effect of leverage on performance appears even stronger in
this sub-period. In the EDC sub-period, we again find evidence of both a direct and an
indirect effect of leverage on ROA, through the capital expenditure channel and the
asset turnover channel, which in turn is directly and negatively affected by excess debt.
In this case, however, the indirect effect of leverage on performance appears stronger
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than the direct one. This is also because, in this sub-period, ROS is positively affected
by higher capital expenditure, which is also negatively affected by excess debt. In turn,
ROS has a positive effect on ROA, so again there is an indirect effect of leverage on
performance.
Overall, the analysis suggests the existence of a complex mechanism through which
the debt overhang issue has affected firm performance during the two financial crises.
In particular, during the GFC there is a strong direct effect of capital structure on
firm performance, while the indirect effect through the capital expenditure channel
appears as a second-order factor. The opposite happens during the EDC, where we
detect indirect effects of excess debt on performance which are stronger than the direct
effect. This may depend on the fact that, initially, over-levered firms were perceived
as more risky, therefore losing market power in favour of more solid competitors; the
lower investments due to the debt overhang issue, instead, were not yet producing
negative effects on their profits. The EDC that followed made the financial turbulence
particularly long for European companies, exacerbating the under-investment issue
for over-levered firms, so that with time their systematically lower capital expenditure
produced effects on their profits. In fact, over-levered firms reported both a lower
asset turnover and a lower ROS, a sign that, by investing less, they were becoming
less capable of extracting value from assets in place, and their operating efficiency was
also deteriorating.
To further investigate the relationship between differences in capital structure and
subsequent profits, we analyze the cumulative performance of companies from the
beginning of the crisis (2008) until the end of our sample period (2017) as a function
of excess debt observed in the final year before the financial crisis. In other words,
we analyze whether the situation of firms’ capital structure at the beginning of the
financial crisis has produced significant effects on their overall performance in the
subsequent years of economic turmoil. Table 4 reports our findings.
[Table 4 about here.]
Columns (1) and (2) refer to ordinary least squares regressions, and indicate that
firms below the target debt ratio experienced an higher performance following the
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GFC than those which were closer to the target itself, as indicated by the coefficient
for Excess debt*NED. Moreover, when also including the Ohlson’s O-score measured
before the crisis as determinant, we also find that more over-levered firms performed
worse, as indicated by the negative coefficient for Excess debt*ED. The coefficient
for Ohlson also suggests that more indebted firms reported a lower profitability in
the aftermath of the GFC and the EDC. Columns (3) and (4) report the results for
interquartile regressions, using the same set of dependent and independent variables,
comparing the 80th with the 20th percentile of the dependent variable ROA. In this
case, we find that differences in the cumulated ROA are mainly due to the ability of
firms to deploy their assets to generate revenues (Asset turnover) and by being below
the target debt ratio (Excess debt*NED), while the other variables do not seem to
produce a significant effect on the dispersion of the measured performance. Overall,
these findings support our previous results and provide further evidence that Eastern
European firms suffered from a debt overhang problem during the global financial
crisis and the European debt crisis.
6. Conclusions
The role of capital structure decisions within a firm represents a long standing debate
in corporate finance. We expand this literature by examining the real effect of differ-
ent leverage policies on firms’ investments and performance, focusing on the transition
economies of Eastern Europe that have joined the European Union. In particular, we
examine whether different capital structure decisions have affected firms’ outcomes
following the financial turbulence that generated outside the examined set of coun-
tries, namely the Global Financial Crisis that started in the US in late 2008, and the
European Debt Crisis that began in Western Europe in 2011. This also allows us to see
the effects that external events produce on companies based in economies that have
been recently integrated in the global economy. In particular, our purpose is to verify
whether the firms examined suffered from a debt overhang issue, so that those with
excess leverage had to reduce investments during the crises due to financial constraint,
and, consequently, experienced lower profitability. If this is true, then failing to adopt
17
an optimal capital structure may directly or indirectly cause a decrease in the ability
to produce returns for investors, hence affecting the value of companies.
We find that during both crises capital structure produces a significant real effect
on the firms in our sample, so that those with an higher-than-optimal level of leverage
report a reduction in capital expenditure and in returns produced. Leverage has both
a direct effect on performance, and an indirect effect through the capital expenditure
channel: over-levered firms invest less, and lower investments in turn produce lower
future profits. More specifically, when examining the determinants of capital expendi-
ture we find that increasing leverage while being already above the target produces a
reduction in investments, whereas no significant relationship emerges for under-levered
firms. Corporate investments display a significant sensitivity to excessive debt usage,
an effect that becomes even stronger during both the GFC and the EDC, providing
supporting evidence to the debt overhang hypothesis, and showing its severity during
periods of financial turbulence.
When we investigate the overall effects of capital structure, both direct and indirect,
on firm value creation, the analysis suggests the existence of a complex mechanism
through which the debt overhang issue affects firm performance. When examining
the entire sample period, we find evidence of both a direct and an indirect effect of
leverage on performance. The transmission channels are however different during the
two financial crises. In particular, during the GFC there is a direct effect of capital
structure on firm performance, while no indirect effect through the capital expenditure
channel. The opposite happens during the EDC, where we detect indirect effects of
excess debt on performance, but no direct effect.
This may indicate that, initially, over-levered firms were perceived as more risky,
therefore losing market power in favour of more solid competitors; this confirms the
results in Love and Zaidi (2010), who suggest that liquidity shocks may produce sig-
nificant effects along the supply chain. On the other hand, capital expenditure may
affect performance only in the long run, so that the lower investments due to the debt
overhang issue were not yet producing negative effects on profits at the beginning of
the crisis. The EDC that followed made the financial turbulence particularly long for
European companies, exacerbating the under-investment issue for over-levered firms,
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so that with time their systematically lower capital expenditure ended up affecting
their ability to produce higher profits. In fact, over-levered firms reported both a
lower asset turnover and a lower ROS (through the capital expenditure channel), a
sign that, by investing less, they were becoming less capable of extracting value from
assets in place, and their operating efficiency was also deteriorating.
Overall, our findings indicate that companies in transition economies were deeply
affected by financial events that had their origin in developed Western economies.
In particular, over-levered firms suffered from a debt overhang issue, so that their
inefficient capital structure affected their ability to pursue optimal levels of investment
and, ultimately, produce higher returns to investors. Indeed, our results indicate that
firms that were under-levered in 2008 experienced higher cumulative profits in the
following decade. Leverage and the ability to use assets to produce revenues are the
two main factors that contribute at explaining differences in performance, showing
that there is a strong and significant debt sensitivity of investments that produces
an effect on performance. In the end, this suggests that capital structure is far from
being irrelevant, and firms may actually decide to maintain excess debt capacity, in the
form of lower-than-optimal leverage, to avoid financing constraints caused by negative
external events.
These findings provide interesting insights to policymakers and capital market reg-
ulators. If financial flexibility plays such an important role in firms’ performance, then
national decision-makers should focus on implementing policies that aim at ensuring
that growth is not limited by financing constraints at the firm level.
In this respect, there are several areas of potential policy intervention. First of
all, authorities should focus on ensuring that credit (and equity) markets operate
properly, especially in periods of financial tensions, in terms both of liquidity and of
transparency.
In addition, they should establish a legal system that facilitates the restructuring
of private-sector debts through the optimal design of bankruptcy procedures and the
efficient operation of the courts system. To this end, default procedures and regulation
in general should guarantee that firms can quickly restore debt capacity by efficiently
re-balancing their capital structure, so that they should not be forced to pass up prof-
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itable investment opportunities simply because they are not able to raise the required
external capital. Among other things, regulation should offer adequate recognition and
validity to of out-of-court settlements, so that lenders and borrowers can quickly and
credibly restructure a firm’s liabilities, without fearing to incur in penalties in the
event of a subsequent bankruptcy.
Another important factor for a successful resolution of a debt overhang condition is
the health of the banking sector. A key factor for implementing restructuring policy is
the ability of banks to recognize losses, and this implies that they must be well capi-
talized to avoid that a financial shock transforms into a credit shock that significantly
constrain firms’ investment behavior.
Further research may complement this work and try to identify what are the legisla-
tive or cultural factors at the country level, if any, that may contribute at explaining
why financial flexibility plays such an important role in the countries investigated.
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Öztekin, Ö., 2015. Capital Structure Decisions around the World: Which Factors Are
Reliably Important? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 50, 301–323.
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Table 1. Time and geographical distribution of firms in the sample
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Bulgaria 230 244 245 247 247 247 247 247 246 244 244 243 243 242 3,416
Croatia 92 108 108 108 109 109 109 107 104 104 105 103 101 101 1,468
Czech Republic 43 43 41 41 37 37 38 38 40 39 39 39 38 38 551
Estonia 11 17 18 18 18 18 17 17 17 17 16 16 16 16 232
Hungary 46 41 42 41 40 41 41 40 40 41 37 34 33 34 551
Latvia 1 28 29 29 29 30 29 30 28 29 26 23 23 20 354
Lithuania 6 23 29 30 30 31 31 29 29 28 26 23 22 22 359
Poland 573 575 580 581 581 583 586 589 589 589 594 592 592 590 8,194
Romania 149 150 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 150 150 150 2,108
Slovakia 41 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 561
Slovenia 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 742
Total 1,245 1,322 1,336 1,339 1,335 1,340 1,342 1,341 1,337 1,335 1,331 1,316 1,311 1,306 18,536
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Table 2. Capital expenditure and capital structure
Estimates of Equation (1) by means of a panel system-GMM estimator. Robust stan-
dard errors are reported in parenthesis. The signs ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Full sample (2004-2017) GFC (2008-2010) EDC (2011-2014)
Capext-1 0.2594*** 0.1945*** 0.2558***
(0.000) (0.010) (0.006)
Excess debtt-1*NEDt-1 0.0120 0.0203 0.0250
(0.008) (0.015) (0.016)
Excess debtt-1*EDt-1 -0.0269*** -0.0277*** -0.0575***
(0.000) (0.011) (0.008)
Profitt-1 0.0348*** 0.0242*** 0.0282***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.003)
Sizet-1 -0.0007*** 0.0015* -0.0007
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Tangiblet-1 -0.0011*** 0.0296*** -0.0107***
(0.000) (0.008) (0.003)
Intangiblet-1 0.0187*** 0.2278*** -0.0037
(0.000) (0.020) (0.011)
Growtht-1 0.0092*** 0.0122*** 0.0069***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
WCt-1 0.0363*** 0.0416*** 0.0220***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.004)
Ohlsont-1 -0.0013*** -0.0003** -0.0010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Casht-1 0.0572*** 0.0911*** 0.0516***
(0.000) (0.009) (0.005)
Eurot 0.0032*** 0.0059 0.0071***
(0.000) (0.008) (0.003)


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4. Pre-crisis leverage and overall performance
Columns (1) and (2) report the results for ordinary least squares regressions with
ROA, cumulated over the 2008-2017 period, as dependent variable. ROS and Asset
turnover are both cumulated over the same time period. Excess debt and Ohlson are
both measured at the end of 2007, before the beginning of the GFC. Columns (3) and
(4) report the results of interquartile regressions, again with the cumulated ROA as
dependent variable, comparing the 80th with the 20th percentile. All regressions include
industry effects. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% is marked with ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ROS (cum.) 0.3554*** 0.3221*** 0.0210 -0.0046
(0.019) (0.033) (0.052) (0.039)
Asset turnover (cum.) 0.0271*** 0.0281*** 0.0263*** 0.0205**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Excess debt*ED 0.0890 -0.3889** -0.0154 0.3056
(0.236) (0.192) (0.214) (0.291)
Excess debt*NED -1.1420*** -0.7255* -0.9541* -1.2154*
(0.391) (0.415) (0.541) (0.676)
Ohlson -0.0654*** -0.0078
(0.015) (0.026)
Constant -0.0614 -0.3526*** 0.1294* -0.0523
(0.058) (0.089) (0.072) (0.321)
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Appendix A: Determinants of the optimal debt ratio
Analysis of capital structure: methodology
This appendix provides a thorough description of our analysis of firms’ capital struc-
ture decisions. In particular, our objective consists in identifying whether firms are
over or under-levered compared to their optimal level of leverage. To do so, we rely on
a classic model of optimal capital structure as defined in Equation (A.1):
Di,t
Ai,t
= α+ βXi,t−1 + ui + εi,t (A.1)
where D is total financial debt, A is total assets, X is a vector of firm characteristics,
i indicates firm, t indicates time, ui indicates firm fixed effects, α and β are parameters,
and ε is the error term.
Then, for any year in the sample we define firms as over-levered (under-levered) if
the debt ratio at the end of the year is greater (smaller) than the estimated target
leverage for that corresponding year, and define the debt misalignment (excess debt,















indicates target leverage for firm i at time t.
More precisely, for each year in the sample period we estimate excessive debt by
first running rolling regressions of Equation (A.1) using only past information in order
to avoid the so-called look-ahead bias9. Then, we use year-specific targets to estimate
the deviation of the observed capital structure from the estimated optimal level.
As potential determinants of target leverage, we consider the firm-level characteris-
tics typically considered in the pertinent literature. A consolidated result in previous
works is the negative relationship of debt ratios with profitability and growth opportu-
nities, and the positive relationship of leverage with firm size and tangible assets (see,
9See Hovakimian and Li (2011) for a thorough description of the estimation procedure and the potential
consequences of failing to account for the look-ahead bias.
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among others, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009)). Therefore,
we include the following variables: profitability, defined as the ratio between operating
cash flow and total assets; size, measured as the natural logarithm of firm sales, cor-
rected for inflation10; tangible, defined as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets; growth
opportunities (growth), measured as the ratio between the total market capitalization
and the book value of equity. Al-Najjar (2011) shows how the same set of potential
determinants of leverage used for developed markets can validly be adopted also for
emerging economies. As discussed in the literature review, firms may attribute value
to financial flexibility, so they may decide to increase leverage to accumulate liquid
resources to be used for quickly undertaking new projects; for this reason, we include
the cash ratio (cash), defined as the sum of cash and equivalents divided by total
assets. Given the growing importance of intangible assets in the modern economy, we
include the variable intangible, obtained as the ratio between intangible assets to total
assets. In recent years the market for intangibles has grown sensibly, and their use in
securitization contracts has increased remarkably (Graham et al. (2018)); hence, we
expect them to behave similarly to tangible assets in providing a form of collateral
that may be used to increase a firm’s debt capacity. We therefore expect a positive
relationship between intangibles and debt. We also control for the relative length of
the cash cycle on capital structure, by including the net working capital ratio (WC ).
We expect a positive relationship between working capital and financial leverage, as
the two may act as partial substitutes in funding firms’ operations. We then include
the average debt ratio in the industry in which the firm operates (industry) in order
to account for differences in capital structure that are connected with industry, rather
than firm, characteristics. Finally, we introduce the dummy Euro, which is equal to
one if the company is incorporated in a country that adopts the European common
currency in the corresponding year, to account for potential effects of belonging to the
Euro area.
We then analyze capital structure decisions under a different perspective, by ex-
amining the relationship between asset growth and sources of funds. To this end, we
estimate the model proposed by Watson and Wilson (2002), defined by the following

















+ ui + εi,t (A.3)
where i indicates firm, t indicates time, ∆A indicates the change in total assets, RE
is retained earnings, ∆D is the change in financial debt, ∆E is the change in equity
(net of reinvested earnings), ∆WC is the change in working capital, u indicates firm
fixed effects, and ε is the error term. This model focuses on how the growth in assets
is funded, by showing how changes in each type of financing sources impacts upon
total financing. Equation (A.3) is generally used as a way to test for the validity of the
pecking order theory: if the magnitude of the coefficients produces a hierarchy that is
consistent with the ordering prescribed by the theory, then it is seen as an empirical
validation of the theory itself. While the relative merit of alternative theories of capital
structure is not the main focus of our work, the relationship between asset growth and
alternative funding sources can help us in interpreting the results from the analysis of
the relationship between capital structure and profitability. Indeed, if firms have a long
term capital structure target, but their year-by-year behaviour is strongly affected by
pecking order arguments, as the empirical literature on capital structure suggests, then
we should expect to observe that their asset growth is mainly funded through retained
earnings and financial debt. In light of the fact that the GFC and the EDC reduced
both profitability and the availability of equity capital (Kahle and Stulz (2013)), then
if the debt overhang hypothesis holds we should expect firms with little internal funds
and limited residual debt capacity to reduce investments and experience a decline in
performance.
Analysis of capital structure: results
We begin our analysis by estimating the optimal debt ratio as a function of a set
of firm characteristics. Table A.1 reports our findings for the estimation of Equation
(A.1) using data referring to the entire sample period.
[Table A.1 about here.]
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Column (1) only considers the four most commonly used determinants of leverage,
as in Rajan and Zingales (1995). In line with previous literature, we find that more
profitable firms are less indebted, those with an higher proportion of tangible assets
use more debt, and larger firms tend to have an higher leverage. We then find that
growth opportunities are associated with an higher debt ratio, contrasting with older
results in the literature (see, e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1995), Flannery and Rangan
(2006), and Öztekin (2015)), but consistent with Elsas and Florysiak (2011). This
is also consistent with firms relying more on debt to support growth, in a period
of recession where internal funds may have become insufficient: this would result in
higher debt for firms which have higher growth opportunities and, consequently, higher
investments to pursue them. All these results consistently hold in augmented specifi-
cations of Equation (A.1), with the exception of firm size that results not statistically
significant for the models in columns (2), (3) and (4). In Column (2) we include two
additional variables: the annual average debt ratio of the industry in which a firm
operates, that always have a significant and positive coefficient, and the proportion of
intangible assets to total assets, that also has a significant and positive relationship
with leverage. While this latter result may appear contradictory, given that intangible
assets have sometimes been used as proxies for the costs of bankruptcy, so that they
had a negative relationship with leverage, it should instead be seen as a finding con-
sistent with the evolution of the modern economy. Indeed, the market for intangibles
has grown significantly in the last decade, as documented in particular by Graham
et al. (2018) for the US market, so that these assets may become a form of implicit
collateral for debtholders, similarly to tangible assets. This would in turn imply that,
by providing collateral value to creditors, they enhance the debt capacity of firms, and
this results in a positive regression coefficient.
We then further enrich our model by adding a dummy equal to one if the firm is
incorporated in a country that adopts the Euro as a currency (Euro), but it does not
result statistically significant (Column (3)). In Columns (4) and (5) we include time
fixed effects, in order to incorporate the effects of macroeconomic shocks in the model,
as these are likely to affect firms’ financing decisions (Krivogorsky et al. (2018)). We
also interact the time fixed effects with the Euro area dummy, in order to allow for
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differences in the effect of these shocks between countries that adopt and do not adopt
the Euro, given that a significant part of the sample period refers to a financial crisis
that is deeply connected with the architecture of the European common currency11.
Our results indicate that firms in Euro-area countries were on average more indebted
before the crisis, as suggested by the interaction between Euro and the dummy for
the year 2008. On the contrary, they ended up being less indebted after the crisis, and
this difference increases as we approach the end of the sample period, as highlighted
by the interaction between the dummy Euro and those for the years 2015, 2016 and
2017. In Column (5) we also add two additional firm-level regressors that are likely to
affect firms’ financing decisions. One is the cash ratio (cash), and we find that firms
with higher liquidity on their balance sheet have less debt, indicating that firms were
likely not issuing debt to pile up cash reserves, but on the contrary these are likely to
be the result of the accumulation of internally generated cash flows. The second is the
working capital ratio (WC ), for which we also find a negative effect on leverage. This
indicates that trade credit was not used as a replacement for financial debt, but as
a complement12: firms in need of more external capital relied on both financial debt
and trade credit; firms that instead were able to support their activity with internal
funds, or those that made equity issues, so that they reported a lower financial debt,
used their internal cash flow or proceeds from equity issues to repay their debts to
both financial and trade creditors. This finding lends no support to the substitution
hypothesis between bank and trade credit in times of financial crises, and suggests
instead that liquidity shocks may propagate along the supply chain, as also reported
by Love and Zaidi (2010). In order to better investigate this finding, we repeat the
regression on two different sub-periods: before the GFC (using data until 2008), and
after the beginning of the GFC (using data after 2008). These additional results are
reported in Table A.2, with Column (1) referring to the pre-crisis and Column (2) to
the post-crisis period. It is interesting to note how, before the GFC, we find evidence
11Note that, in order to preserve space and for an easier readability of Table A.1, we only report the coefficients
for the statistically significant interactions between time fixed effects and the dummy Euro.
12Recall that a more positive WC indicates lower net operating liabilities, and vice-versa. The negative coeffi-
cient therefore indicates that higher operating liabilities (i.e. a lower WC ) were associated with higher financial
debt.
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of substitution between trade credit and financial debt, as indicated by the positive
coefficient for WC. On the contrary, after the explosion of the GFC this relationship
reverses, and trade credit appears not to be a substitute for financial debt, suggesting
that firms that were not able to raise capital from banks were also having difficulties
in obtaining credit from their suppliers.
[Table A.2 about here.]
It is also interesting to notice the increase (in absolute value) of the coefficients for
profit and cash following the GFC, suggesting that changing market conditions have
likely induced firms to adopt a behavior more consistent with the pecking order theory,
so that firms with larger internal funds avoided raising new external capital and relied
less on debt. This is consistent with the idea that both the GFC and the EDC have
increased the cost of raising new capital, so that firms may have rationally decided to
avoid accessing capital markets when they had sufficient internal funds.
We conclude this part of the analysis by examining the relationship between asset
growth and financing decisions; to this end, we estimate the Watson and Wilson (2002)
model from Equation (A.3). We report the corresponding results in Table A.3.
[Table A.3 about here.]
When looking at the full sample period, our findings indicate that the relative im-
portance of the different funding instruments is perfectly consistent with the pecking
order theory: retained earnings have the largest coefficient, followed by debt and eq-
uity, while working capital management represents a marginal source of funds. This is
true for firms incorporated both in the Euro area and outside it. However, Euro area
firms seem to rely less on internal funds, more on debt and less on equity than firms
based in countries not adopting the common currency, consistently with the findings
of Muradoǧlu et al. (2014).
When separating the pre-crisis period (2004-2008) from the crisis period (2009-
2014), interesting patterns emerge. When looking at firms based in the Euro area, we
find that before the crisis they relied on internal funds and equity as the two primary
sources of capital, while debt came in third place. On the contrary, during the crisis
their use of external equity decreased, at the advantage of debt, which becomes the
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second source of funds, coming after reinvested earnings. Moreover, during the crisis
working capital is not even statistically significant, confirming our previous finding
that, during the GFC and the EDC, there was no substitution effect between financial
debt and trade credit. When looking instead at firms based outside the Euro area,
we still observe a decrease in the use of new external equity during the crisis, but the
difference between the two periods is much less pronounced. Again, these findings are in
line with those reported in Muradoǧlu et al. (2014): when their country of incorporation
joins the European Union, companies increase the use of external equity. Then, when
they also adopt the European common currency, they experience an increase in debt
capacity, and gradually increase their use of leverage.
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Table A.1. Determinants of debt ratios
Estimates of Equation (A.1) by means of a panel fixed-effects estimator. Robust stan-
dard errors are reported in parenthesis. The signs ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Profitability -0.1684*** -0.1571*** -0.1571*** -0.1581*** -0.1558***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Growth 0.0080*** 0.0131*** 0.0131*** 0.0153*** 0.0159***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Tangible 0.0934*** 0.0911*** 0.0921*** 0.0979*** 0.0592**
(0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Size 0.0099** 0.0071 0.0071 0.0058 0.0102**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Intangible 0.2726*** 0.2730*** 0.2512** 0.1809*





Industry 0.7099*** 0.7133*** 0.6698*** 0.6410***











Intercept 0.0448 -0.0926* -0.0917* -0.0900* -0.0731
(0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
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Table A.2. Financial debt and working capital before and after the global financial crisis
Estimates of Equation (A.1) by means of a panel fixed-effects estimator on two sub-
samples of the dataset. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The signs
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10%.
(1) (2)
Profitability -0.0561** -0.1577***
(0.029) (0.034)
Growth 0.0055 0.0188***
(0.004) (0.004)
Tangible 0.0713*** 0.0610**
(0.023) (0.030)
Size 0.0060 0.0078
(0.008) (0.005)
Intangible 0.1471* 0.1934***
(0.083) (0.037)
Cash -0.0735*** -0.2442***
(0.027) (0.048)
WC 0.2508*** -0.1651***
(0.085) (0.039)
Intercept -0.0880 -0.0338
(0.093) (0.063)
38
T
a
b
le
A
.3
.
A
ss
et
G
ro
w
th
a
n
d
S
o
u
rc
es
o
f
F
u
n
d
s
E
st
im
at
es
o
f
E
q
u
a
ti
o
n
(A
.3
)
b
y
m
ea
n
s
of
a
p
a
n
el
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
es
ti
m
at
or
ov
er
d
iff
er
en
t
ti
m
e
an
d
ge
og
ra
p
h
ic
al
su
b
-s
am
p
le
s.
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
p
or
te
d
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
is
.
T
h
e
si
gn
s
**
*,
**
,
an
d
*
in
d
ic
at
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
P
er
io
d
2
0
0
4
-2
0
1
7
P
er
io
d
2
0
0
4
-2
0
0
8
P
er
io
d
2
0
0
9
-2
0
1
4
F
u
ll
sa
m
p
le
E
u
ro
=
0
E
u
ro
=
1
F
u
ll
sa
m
p
le
E
u
ro
=
0
E
u
ro
=
1
F
u
ll
sa
m
p
le
E
u
ro
=
0
E
u
ro
=
1
E
ar
n
in
gs
1.
76
95
**
*
1.
78
47
**
*
1
.5
1
5
7
*
*
*
1
.7
8
9
9
*
*
*
1
.8
0
8
3
*
*
*
1
.4
6
4
8
*
*
*
1
.7
5
7
2
*
*
*
1
.7
6
8
5
*
*
*
1
.4
4
2
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.1
1
2
)
(0
.0
7
8
)
(0
.0
8
0
)
(0
.3
0
0
)
(0
.0
5
6
)
(0
.0
5
9
)
(0
.1
8
5
)
D
eb
t
1.
28
70
**
*
1.
27
72
**
*
1
.3
4
9
9
*
*
*
1
.2
5
0
1
*
*
*
1
.2
4
0
4
*
*
*
1
.1
3
9
0
*
*
*
1
.1
6
4
5
*
*
*
1
.1
5
1
8
*
*
*
1
.3
7
1
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
4
0
)
(0
.0
4
1
)
(0
.1
5
0
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
8
0
)
E
q
u
it
y
1.
26
39
**
*
1.
26
81
**
*
1
.0
1
5
4
*
*
*
1
.2
7
8
5
*
*
*
1
.2
7
7
2
*
*
*
1
.4
2
5
4
*
*
*
1
.2
0
4
7
*
*
*
1
.2
0
7
2
*
*
*
1
.1
0
4
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
6
3
)
(0
.0
3
0
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
(0
.1
2
9
)
(0
.0
2
3
)
(0
.0
2
4
)
(0
.0
9
5
)
W
C
-0
.3
14
4*
**
-0
.3
19
6*
**
-0
.2
0
7
7
*
*
*
-0
.3
1
3
7
*
*
*
-0
.3
1
9
3
*
*
*
-0
.3
5
2
1
*
*
-0
.3
1
1
3
*
*
*
-0
.3
2
1
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
2
2
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
3
5
)
(0
.0
3
6
)
(0
.1
5
6
)
(0
.0
2
2
)
(0
.0
2
3
)
(0
.0
6
5
)
In
te
rc
ep
t
0.
00
61
**
*
0.
00
72
**
*
-0
.0
1
0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
2
2
6
*
*
*
0
.0
2
3
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
7
9
0
.0
0
1
6
0
.0
0
2
5
-0
.0
0
5
1
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
39
